SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
AND THE
AMERICAN MILITARY TRADITION

List of Works Reviewed

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It has only been during the past twenty-five years that American intellectuals have given serious attention to the military, both as a body unto itself and in terms of strategy and national policy. The reasons for this are not hard to come by, nor should they long detain us here. The point; however, has importance for understanding Samuel P. Huntington, as a scholar, and for what his works have revealed about the place of military profession in U.S. society. If nothing else, the sum total of Huntington's scholarship has opened a whole new avenue of intellectual inquiry for the American academy. His writings have both paralleled and traced the growth of America as a world power and, with it, the transformation of the military from a neglected stepchild of a liberal and isolationist society into a front-running engine of history's foremost superpower.
The story is fascinating, and Huntington's absorbing analysis of it has secured his place as one of this generation's most important chroniclers of history and sociology.

Until the end of World War II American society had little reason to concern itself with the military. The vast protection afforded by the two oceans and the British Navy, an ingrained anti-militarism stemming from colonial times and the resultant mind-set to define world politics in a legalistic and constitutional framework consistently kept the American people prejudiced against the military. The importance of military power and the unique culture of military professionalism were generally ignored.

This was a luxury few countries could afford. It reflected the fact that until 1945 the United States was a "sleeping giant," generations after Europe had already experienced first-hand knowledge about the deadly realities of organized and professional military strength. The first modern General Staff, for example, was established by Prussia in 1808, while it was not until nearly a century afterward that a similar organization arose in America.

After World War II, however, the U.S. was forced to alter drastically its thinking on international politics. The military became a central concern, especially in 1949 when NATO was formed and in 1950 when the Korean War began. Like it or not, the United States became the global guardian of a vast alliance network which depended upon American power for its existence and prosperity. Americans—for the first time—had to maintain vigilance in peacetime. This meant that they had to support a strong peacetime military force, a proposition for which their experience had not prepared them. During this decade began the spate of intellectual analyses of U.S. military strategy that produced the Huntington, Kahns, Os-goods, Kissingers and others who helped transform the role and image of American scholarship on international affairs. Breaking with a previous tradition of innocent and utopian promotions of world government to the anti-foreign isolationism of the 1930's, the new intellectual tradition of the Cold War focused sharply on the tough requirements of strategy and survival in the jungle world of international politics.

Although Huntington is not primarily a strategist, his place alongside the other masters is secure. Both The Soldier and the State and The Common Defense are seminal works. With only a handful of other individuals (e.g. Janowitz and Moskos) Huntington has
centered his concerns on the military *per se* and its historic and contemporary role in American culture: the military as a sociological phenomenon and as a political actor.

Philosophically, Huntington blends a uniquely American conservative understanding of the nature of world politics with an unconcealed admiration of the professional military "ethic," a phenomenon he defines as similar to the school of political "realism" which advanced in this country after World War II. By his own definition he is a "neo-Hamiltonian." Yet, there is an air of detachment about his style throughout most of his works. Not *primarily* partisan nor *necessarily* a sympathizer of all things military, he is above all an analyst. Almost scientific, he has carefully unfolded the origins of the military in American society and the nature of military professionalism compared to the, otherwise, anti-military habits of the U.S. public. Unlike such European-born "realists" as Hans Morgenthau, Huntington is thoroughly American. There is nothing "old-world" or Machiavellian about his writings. Rather than accepting the traditional liberal view of the military as a scheming harbinger of war and evil, however, he has sketched a much deeper and far more revealing portrait of what was, until the mid-1950's, perhaps American's least understood and most consistently maligned and frustrated professional body. The story begins when *The Soldier and the State* first appeared in 1957.

A. *The Soldier and the State*

*The Soldier and the State* offered, for the first time in recent history, a serious challenge to the embedded American notion that the military was evil, that it should be kept small and in its place and that-like the proverbial Fire Department-the military should exist only to respond to the rare emergency, and then to disappear from sight until needed again. While such views-rooted deeply within U.S. history and political culture-may have sufficed when America was able to afford isolationism, they were outdated when *The Soldier and the State* first appeared. As both an historian and sociologist, Huntington has reached as far back as the eighteenth century to present in this work his own interpretation of civil-military relations in American society.

In his first book-and afterwards-there remains a consistent and dominant theme which runs throughout Huntington's work which is that there is a natural pendulum of civil-military relations in any
modern society. That pendulum can shift either "left" or "right,"
depending upon the position of the military vis-$-vis the civilian
elements of political control. It is too far right if the military
dominate; too far left if it is isolated or excluded.

Within this spectrum Huntington is a "centrist": he views the
professional military as a body with customs and mores all its own,
and writes that a healthy society must preserve the autonomy of the
military while simultaneously integrating it into an important
decision-making role. In *The Soldier and the State* this thesis is
stated at the outset:

Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military
relations have a great advantage in the search for security. They
increase their likelihood of reaching right answers to the operating
issues of military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced
pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run
uncalculated risks. (p. 2)

From the beginning, Huntington never strays from this central
point. To the extent that he is an "advocate" (a term used by
one reviewer) this is it. To the extent that he has been "controversial"
(in liberal and revisionist circles) it is because he has
carefully and forcefully cleared the intellectual landscape of the
set of unreal assumptions about the military that have been habit-
ually lodged in the American-liberal mentality.

*The Soldier and the State* has three parts. Part I offers an his-
torical and theoretical overview of military institutions with the
nation-state. Historically, it traces the origins of the "professional"
military, i.e., the officer corps and the General Staff, in modern
society, especially in the two archetypes of professional "militarism":
Germany and Japan. Beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, the
aristocratic officership of Old Europe gave way to the streamlined
and bureaucratic professionalism of nineteenth century military sci-
ence, including the draft system, the officer corps, and the modern
industrialized state. In all of these categories Prussia led the way,
symbolized by the genius of the greatest military theorist of the
period, Karl von Clausewitz. In the United States, compared to
Europe and Japan, there was no aristocracy and, hence, military
professionalism—developed from aristocratic origins—was defined
as "undemocratic" and, thus, undesirable.

Huntington is an avowed admirer of the military *as a profession.*
This does not mean that he is necessarily pro-military or a "mill-
tarist"—a point some of his critics fail to understand. (Does one have to be "pro-police" to appreciate an efficient police force?) It means simply, as was stated in the passage quoted above, that efficiency and competence are far better qualities, under any circumstances, than their opposites. These qualities, furthermore, are a direct result of the change toward military professionalism undertaken and led by Prussia in the last century. In *The Soldier and the State* Huntington makes the point:

> Professional competence and the professional spirit reached their fullest development in Prussia. The smooth functioning efficiency of the Prussian armies of 1866 and 1870 stands out in sharp contrast to the fumbling confusion of the English army of 1856, the American armies of the Civil War, and the Austrian and French armies which Prussia defeated. (p. 53)

Huntington contrasts Bismarck's Prussia, however, with the anti-military monster state created by Hitler. Nazi Germany, he writes, was a classic case of the party-led totalitarian regime which kept the professional military out of the mainstream of political decisions. The military as a profession, Huntington maintains, has usually favored stability, caution, and restraint in foreign policy. The civilian ideologue, by contrast, has usually been the advocate for "decisive" action, reckless diplomacy, and the type of strategic ignorance which leads to war. The essence of Huntington's message comes out in his summary of the German generals under Hitler: "The attitude of the German generals was virtually a perfect expression of the military ethic. They wanted to rebuild Germany's armed might, but they wanted to do so slowly, and not in order to wage war but to protect German security." (p. 114)

As Huntington defines the military "ethic," therefore, it is innately conservative and disciplined. A military force unchecked by civilian political constraints, however, can be as dangerous as the unleashed demagogue. Imperial Japan, he writes, was a case in point. The inordinately powerful voice of the Japanese military between the wars violated the healthy balance necessary for selective and restrained national security policies. This reflected upon the "political militarism" of the Japanese officer corps: they became the strongest element of the national ideology. Instead of the aloof and professional guardian of the state, the Japanese military became the armed symbol of the nation unchecked by civilian power, undisciplined, and politicized. Either way, Huntington concludes, a
too-weak and overly-controlled military voice (as in Nazi Germany) or a too-strong and unregulated one (Imperial Japan) will almost inevitably produce national disaster, if not immediately, certainly in the long run.

The heart of Huntington's "theory" of civil-military relations is contained in his twin definitions of "objective" and "subjective" civilian control. At times exasperating and confusing, these definitions leave a good deal to be desired, compared with his more succinct and empirical historical analysis. Primarily an academic exercise, the concept of "subjective" civilian control means enhancing the political power of specific civilian groups, while "objective" civilian control means maximizing the professionalism of the military as a servant of the state. Although ideal-types and largely theoretical, these forms of control have, however, been exercised in varying ways throughout history.

Huntington naturally favors "objective" control of the military although he admits that "a high level of objective civilian control has been a rare phenomenon even more among modern western societies. (p. 85). He does not, however, offer concrete steps for the attainment of objective civilian control (although he does explain its conditions). The existence of two theoretical-types of civilian control is Huntington's contribution to this form of military scholasticism. As such, however, it will probably remain a classroom exercise.

Part II of *The Soldier and the State* deals exclusively with the American experience until 1940. Although the material is primarily historical, Huntington rarely loses sight of his main theme, and he is neither forgiving nor compromising in his treatment of liberalism's negative impact on the American military. "Liberalism," he writes, "dominated American thinking from the Revolution though the first half of the twentieth century [and] does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function. . . . Liberalism in the United States has been unchanging, monotonous and all-embracing" (pp. 144-145).

As a latter-day Emory Upton (who wrote favorably on a professional military force in the last century), Huntington is devastating in his critique of the liberal mind-not so much as an historical expression of American cultural roots but as a lingering force in a Cold War setting where it was antiquated. It is small wonder, therefore, that such liberal military historians as Walter
Millis find "explosive disagreement" (Millis' term) with the thrust of Huntington's "conservative" learnings. To label Huntington as grossly one-sided, however, is unfair to his research and scholarly accomplishments in *The Soldier and the State*. Part II is lucid, comprehensive, and systematic. It would be almost impossible, furthermore, to write such a history without passing judgments, and the ones which Huntington makes have become almost conventional wisdom in U.S. scholarship since the Cold War began.

After explaining the ways in which a liberal American society has defined the "proper" role of the military, Huntington next discusses the "structural constraints": the constitution vs civilian control. His ideal of "objective" control has been largely unattainable in American history, he claims, since there is no real constitutional provision for control. With an ingrained system of state militia and minus an aristocracy or even a foreseeable professional military, the framers of the constitution had no real need to institute a system of control over a hypothetical General Staff. This vacuum was filled by the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, which *de facto* kept the military in line, and the isolationist foreign policies which kept it small and removed from the rest of society. Civilian control in America, therefore, became a product of ideology and geography and in a technical sense never existed-the myth of U.S. history textbooks notwithstanding. Americans, Huntington writes, "have been deluding themselves. They have ascribed to the Constitution a virtue of geography" (p. 190).

The remainder of Part II traces the origins, nature, and chronology of the American military tradition up to World War II. Prior to the Civil War, there were no important military institutions in the United States, a factor which was intimately connected also with the political failure of Hamiltonian conservatism. The three strains which contributed to the pre-Civil War military were, according to Huntington, "technicism," "popularism," and "professionalism." The first, which was Jeffersonian in origin, emphasized the engineering aspects of military science during that time and derived its strength from the pragmatic and empirical roots of American culture. The second was Jacksonian and reflected the innate American opposition to the officer corps as a form of aristocracy. The third strain-professionalism-came almost exclu-
sively from the old South and was the product of Southern romanticism, conservatism, and agrarianism.

The defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, however, ended the only remaining source of national (or sectional) sympathy for the military. The rise of what Huntington calls the dominant philosophy of "business pacifism" led by Herbert Spencer and William Graham Summer isolated the armed forces even further from the political, social, and intellectual momentum of post-bellum U.S. culture. Limited to an average strength of 25,000 men, the Army was even physically isolated, with small posts strung throughout the West manned by units which rarely came into contact with the rest of society.

Out of this period, however, (called the "Dark Ages") came the immediate rise of military professionalism in the United States and, ultimately, the first modern problems of civil-military relations. The years of isolation and peace, Huntington writes, were formative in shaping the modern American military structure and military professionalism:

The very isolation and rejection which reduced the size of the services and hampered technological advance made these same years the most fertile, creative and formative in the history of the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able and permitted to develop a distinctive military character. (p. 229)

The "creative core," as Huntington calls it, was centered around the figures of General's William Sherman, Emory Upton, and Admiral Stephen B. Luce, all towering military men of the 1870's and 80's who, collectively, began the ideas, writings, institutions, and courses of instruction which started the military on its professional way. Modeled mostly after Europe, Germany in particular, the American military "grew up" during these years into a elite and secure professional body, competent in its own way, but still fundamentally removed from the rest of the society it was pledged to defend. As U.S. society grew more liberal, in short, the military grew more conservative in thinking, dress, institutions, and ideology.

The "second wave" of military professionalism in U.S. history began with the influence of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan in the 1890's and continued with General Leonard Wood and the "preparedness" campaign of World War I. They joined with Republican politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge in a rare
fusion for (U.S. history) of military and political cultures. During this period the U.S. Navy embarked on its two-ocean path, colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific were established and, more importantly from the viewpoint of military professionalism, the overhaul of U.S. military institutions by Secretary of War Elihu Root resulted in the first modern General Staff for the United States.

This "neo-Hamiltonian compromise," as Huntington calls it, failed to last beyond World War I. It was ended, basically, by the American people's faith in Wilsonian internationalism with an inherent linking of the military with war and a resurgent belief in the optimistic progress of mankind. By the 1930's the American military was, once again, a stranger in its own land.

Part III is the last section of *The Soldier and the State* and discusses the vast revolution in U.S. civil-military relations brought on by World War II and the Cold War.

By its definition and totality, World War II brought the American military out of its enforced shell and onto center-stage in the U.S. political system. Since the military received *carte blanche* control over the conduct of the war, it emerged as the dominant single professional body in post-war American politics; a true revolution in civil-military relations if there ever was one. Yet Huntington is quick to point out that this new-found power did not come without its price. By accepting the reins of political power, the military-by definition-blended with the national environment and was forced, willingly or not, to absorb many of the political traits of American culture. As Huntington expresses it: "the military leaders blended with the liberal environment; they lost their alien and aloof character and emerged as the supreme embodiment of the national purpose" (p. 315). This began, in reality, the first important and ongoing tensions in U.S. civil-military relations.

At this point Huntington injects his own theory of "fusion" to describe the new realities of military political power. In contradistinction to the "garrison state" thesis advanced by Harold Lasswell, Huntington proposes his own theory, a blend of his conservative ethic with the corporate and intellectual integration of the military into post-World War II American society.

Lasswell's prediction of a totalitarian "garrison" society emerging in the United States, similar to the Soviet Union and based
upon military influence, Huntington claims, is the pessimistic, all-or-nothing world of the anti-military liberal. Against this kind of thinking, he promotes the fusionist concept; not really a theory so much as a description of reality. He goes on to describe this reality as it emerged in the 1950's: the near-complete absorption of military officers in the mainstream of national economic and political life, symbolized by the first military President since General Grant. The military, as Huntington explains it, came full-circle—from unwanted orphan to father figure. Out of these changes would come the "military-industrial complex" issue; an issue ironically first mentioned by the most popular military officer of our time, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In his chapter on the political role of the post-war Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Huntington reveals his admiration for the foreign policy of the Truman Administration. Essentially a liberal administration, it conducted, nevertheless, a conservative foreign policy, shaped and articulated by a combination of military officers and "neo-Hamiltonian" statesmen. Inevitably, however, this tenuous blend couldn't last. The frustrations of the Korean War produced the "business liberalism" of the Eisenhower Administration, one led by a former General but, because of that, one in which the influence of the military per se was not needed and, as a result, declined.

The final chapters of *The Soldier and the State* show the newly-emerging (in 1956) powers of Congress and the Federal bureaucracy in strategic programs. These are largely descriptive in nature, although Huntington is careful not to get very far from his single most important point: that the best national security policy needs a combination of professional and autonomous military leadership integrated ("fused") with intelligent ("neo-Hamiltonian") statesmanship and domestic political support. This is a blend of the domestic liberal with the foreign policy conservative, a team Huntington finds the most responsible for sound security policies and historically evidenced best in the Truman Administration.

In the last chapter, Huntington pleads for this type of combination. He applauds the "academic realism" of Kennan and Morgenthau and argues for a "new conservatism" consistent with America's liberal past but strengthened by the emerging realism of the actual conduct of war and foreign policy. "In a liberal society," he concludes,
the power of the military is the greatest threat to their professional-
ism. . . . The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environ-
ment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure. (p. 464)

Whether his advice has been taken can be argued. In any case, this is a natural breaking point to move the story further, to 1961 when *The Common Defense* first appeared.

B. *The Common Defense, Strategic Programs in National Politics*

*The Common Defense* takes up where *The Soldier and the State* left off but, in some very important ways, it is a much different book. Its focus is narrower than *The Soldier and the State*. *The Common Defense* reviews the interaction of politics, economics, and personalities in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and how these internal factors helped shape defense policies, strategic programs in particular. It is more detailed and exhaustive than *The Soldier and the State*; it can be considered, in fact, the specific application of those broad historical and sociological themes which Huntington first developed in 1957.

In *The Soldier and the State* Huntington showed how the mili-
tary was isolated from the rest of society, and how it tried to over-
come those handicaps which American political culture had fostered upon it. In *The Common Defense* the thrust is nearly the opposite. By 1960 there was a national consensus on the importance of the military in the decision-making process for foreign and defense policies. The military, in short, had become "fused" into the main-
stream of political life. *The Common Defense*, therefore, starts from a different perspective than *The Soldier and the State*. It treats politics affecting strategic programs rather than vice versa. It is concerned with pressure groups, budgets, political parties, etc., and how these affect the military *per se* and military policies generally. The differences between these two books, in short, almost exactly parallels the differences in how U.S. defense policies were made be-
fore World War II and how they were made afterward. The result is two completely different books, reflecting two very different per-
spectives, both by the same author, with the same consistent outlook and philosophy.

*The Common Defense* has seven parts. Part I is very brief and
serves, in fact if not in name, as the book's Introduction. In this section, Huntington makes several interesting points. One concerns the differences between "structure" and "strategy" in military planning. Structural planning includes those domestic conditions which affect the size and shape of the armed forces: budgets, personnel, organization, material, etc. Strategy involves the use, composition, disposition, and movement of military force. Throughout most of U.S. history, structural planning, in peacetime, was nearly the sum total of military policy; there was, in fact, no need for strategy since the U.S. had little or no foreign policy. With the onset of the Cold War, however, strategic decisions became necessary as part and parcel of American global commitments. The U.S., in short, entered the real world of politics and was forced to act accordingly.

Structure is domestically-oriented and relatively simple. Strategy is international and, by comparison, profound and complex, with implications which often involve issues of war and peace. Huntington describes the difference this way: "A decision to build a long-range missile within three years is strategic. A decision to have it built by the Army in a governmental arsenal instead of a private company is structural" (p. 5).

Since these constitute the "two worlds" of military policy, The Common Defense is about them both, but with a natural emphasis on strategy between 1945 and 1960. During those years, Huntington writes, American defense policy was in a state of "disequilibrium," a term he uses to imply fast change, intense public discussion, and partisan debate, with great importance attached to foreign policy (compared to earlier years, when policy was routine and unemotional). During this period of disequilibrium the broadly-based "containment" policy dominated, but its many rivals inside the country tried several times to dethrone it. These included spokesmen for various forms of neo-isolationism, "liberation," preventive war, and "appeasement" policies. All of them, at one time or another, had their constituencies in Congress and around the nation, and their several interest groups were important contenders in the national debates over the proper American strategy. These, too, are part of the story Huntington unravels in The Common Defense.

This story begins with Part II, the interim years, when America underwent the "search for a stable deterrent." In this part, the narrative unwinds from an "insiders" perspective. Almost corn-
pletely chronological and factual, Part II of *The Common Defense* demonstrates the several pressures which moved American decision-makers to adopt, first the political policy of containment, then increased military strength through NATO and NSC 68, to the New Look doctrine of massive retaliation, into, finally, the "New New Look" (Huntington's phrase) which reflected the "balance of terror" that had emerged by 1956. Part II, therefore, is basically Huntington's perspective of domestic and foreign pressures on U.S. leaders during the first fifteen years of the Cold War.

The first of these pressures was traditional: the generic American drive to "bring the boys home" after a successful war. From a strategy of mobilization during World War II, America quickly switched to a strategy of demobilization. This, in turn, underwent an abrupt change of its own after the external pressure of Soviet actions in eastern Europe and Germany moved Washington into the new strategy of deterrence. For the first time in its history, the United States was forced to practice vigilance during peacetime. This produced an overnight "revolution" in American decision-making; one that moved the military into the center of political action and, in turn, introduced a sharp conflict between domestic and foreign considerations. For the first time, in short, the U.S. had to choose between "guns and butter."

The domestic demands for a balanced budget collided with the increased need for the enforcement of the Truman Administration's "containment" policy. Struggles between bureaucracies, lobbying groups, ideologies, and sectional political interests ensued. There was conflict between the military services, just as there was between the advocates of various competing strategies. Huntington has summarized the state of confusion which existed at the time when the U.S. set out on its first great strategic venture during peacetime:

> The implications of neither limited war, nor mobilization, nor nuclear airpower were fully spelled out. An inadequate balance existed but no overall strategic plan. Budgetary policy gave domestic needs priority and left the country without the military forces to implement either the foreign policy of the diplomats or the strategy of the soldiers. The Army did not get UMT. The Air Force did not get the 70 wings it wanted. The State Department did not get its limited war divisions. (p. 47)

NSC 68, the comprehensive review of the U.S. strategy begun in 1950, came partly as a result of this confusion, but more so be-
cause of external pressures: the fall of China to Communism and the Soviet atomic bomb. Along with the military demands of the Korean War, the U.S. underwent an extensive rearmament program between 1950 and 1953. The defense budget in 1949 was $13 billion, in 1953 it was $50 billion; in 1950 defense took 5% of GNP, in 1953 it took, over 13%. Both NSC 68 (which recommended major increases in U.S. defense spending) and the Korean War catapulted strategic programs into the forefront of American priorities. Nevertheless, in the Eisenhower Administration, they still had to deal with competition from the domestic quarter.

Dulles' New Look strategy of 1954, which emphasized the role of strategic airpower, was the result of the great lead which the U.S. then had over the Soviet Union in intercontinental weapons. It was also due to the business ethic which pervaded that Administration; one which considered a balanced budget as important as a strong deterrent. "Massive retaliation," therefore, came as a result of both internal and external factors.

The doctrine of massive retaliation, however, quickly gave way to what Huntington describes as the "New New Look": an indirect response to increasing budgetary demands but, more importantly, a response to the gains in strategic rocketry made by the U.S.S.R.

By 1956 the balance of terror became, in Huntington's words, "the decisive military fact" of the time (p. 92). The Administration's response was generally to rest on the strategic lead which it had maintained and to permit the Soviet Union to equalize this lead and, ultimately, even to erode it significantly. In other words, the origins of the famous "missile gap" issue of the 1960 Presidential campaign go back to 1956 when apparently the Eisenhower Administration made the decision unilaterally to withdraw from the arms race and to concede equality, or even superiority, to the Soviet Union. In defense of this interpretation, Huntington illustrates the priority of budgetary restraints in the Eisenhower defense budgets (the quest for "stability"), and the Administration's refusal to budge from its course despite warnings (from the Gaither Committee, for example). To document further this point he quotes Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles as advocating an early version of the "overkill" theory and a strategic doctrine of "sufficiency" (both concepts, incidentally, still very much alive in the late 1970's). According to Defense Secretary McElroy, Huntington writes, the United States was even willing to concede a 3 to 1 Soviet superiority in long-range missiles by the early 1960's!
The fact that this never came about had less to do with the Eisenhower Administration than it did with the unexplained slowdown in Soviet production. Congress, furthermore, felt that the Administration was not responding fast enough to Soviet missile achievements and appropriated more funds for the ICBM and Polaris programs than the Administration had requested. By 1961, therefore, President Kennedy discovered that the "missile gap" had disappeared almost as fast as it arose. Through a combination of advanced planning (NSC 68), foreign aggression (Korea), and unknown problems of Soviet industrial capacity plus an unequalled ability for technological innovation of its own, the United States was able to hold the line on its strategic military lead. The myriad of internal pressures which helped produce U.S. strategic planning during this time constitutes most of the remaining sections of The Common Defense.

Part III develops in detail the continuing tug-of-war between the executive and the legislature in strategic planning. Although written in 1961, this section (just like the one on the missile gap and the "New New Look") has relevance for today, although, obviously, conditions have changed considerably.

The essence of the strategic planning process, Huntington maintains, is consensus: the often, awkward, time-consuming, and "behind-the-scenes" juggling for position and priority. Strategic planning, in the final analysis, is politics pure and simple, with each department, agency, and interest group using whatever political lever it can command to achieve its end. Huntington describes the essence of strategic planning in Washington as follows:

Strategic programs, like other major policies, are not the product of expert planners, who rationally determine the actions necessary to achieve desired goals. They are the result of controversy, negotiation and bargaining among officials and groups with different interests and perspectives. The conflicts between budgeteers and security spokesmen, between the defenders of military and non-military programs, among the four services, and among the partisans of massive retaliation, continental defense and limited war, are as real and as sharp as most conflicts of group interests in Congress.

Strategic programs, therefore, often represent a compromise between competing bureaucracies, the military, and Congress. Inside this ongoing battle, however, the executive has the natural advantages of initiative, knowledge and advanced, systematic planning. During the first fifteen years of the Cold War, in fact, the
executive determined the overall U.S. military effort and the strategy which shaped it. During this period Congress never vetoed directly a major strategic program, a force level recommendation or a major weapons system proposed by the executive! On only one major occasion (the Navy's second carrier) did Congress fail to appropriate weapons funds recommended by the Administration. This contrasts with the many times in which Congress cut back funds recommended for domestic programs.

What accounts for the consistent hegemony which the executive has over strategic planning? According to Huntington, executive priority is a result of the nature and locus of political power in America and of the nature of defense policy itself. He defines Congress as a "lobbyist" inside this process: it can prod and goad the Administration on behalf of specific programs, it can investigate decisions and issues, it can deny money or spend more, but Congress-by definition-cannot lead, it must follow.

As a lobbyist (a definition which seems equally appropriate today), Congress is at a natural disadvantage. The executive, particularly the JCS and NSC, can "legislate" strategic planning in much the same way that Congress legislates domestic policy. As Huntington puts it: "Just as Congress often wrote tariff legislation by giving each industry the protection it wanted, so at times the NSC and JCS make decisions on weapons by giving each service what it wants" (p. 154). Indeed, inside the executive branch the internal politicking on behalf of weapons and programs can be as intense as that between the two branches of government themselves.

The natural advantages of executive leadership—once a decision has been made—leaves the initiative up to the President. He will use various methods to defend his program; methods which, in retrospect, seem time-immemorial in an age of the "imperial presidency." According to Huntington there are six ways in which the executive can protect or defend its strategic decisions: 1) restriction of information, 2) suppression of leaks, 3) minimizing Soviet achievements, 4) minimizing U.S. deficiencies, 5) reluctance to make formal pronouncements on strategic programs, and 6) restriction of testimony before Congress. It, obviously, takes very little imagination to appreciate the continuing and expansive nature of the presidential prerogative in defense policy since 1961. The issues are permanent and are not confined to either the Nixon or the Carter
Administrations. They were as alive twenty years ago as they are today.

In response to criticisms made in the 1950's against the growth of executive power, Huntington remains true to his conservative and neo-Hamiltonian leanings. He defends the principle of executive priority in the American democracy-awkward as it may be-as the only one feasible for strategic planning. He shows how the critics of the 1950's echo the past and how their criticisms were endemic to the American political system itself and how, on practically every occasion, the critics failed to realize their objectives—or simply missed the mark altogether.

Criticism of strategy-making is thus the latest phase in a prolonged confrontation or dialogue between American intellectuals and reformers and American political institutions. It is directed at the appearance in the strategy-making process of characteristics pervasive in American government-The criticisms of the strategic reformers go to the very roots of the government system. . . . The conditions which they protest is not a passing one, the product or particular men or events. (p. 173)

The relative parochial and reactive powers of Congress in the strategy-making process and the overall ignorance and passivity of the general public has made the executive nearly supreme in defense planning. As a conservative, Huntington understands and defends this, but as a neo-Hamiltonian American he still feels uncomfortable with it. He is compelled, therefore, to offer a solution, true to his "centrist" instincts, which would bridge the gap between left and right, between reform and security. This he does in the last few pages of Part III; a plea against the tight centralization of power in the executive with a proposal for the "opening up" of policy proposals for more extensive debate "before a decision is reached" (p. 196). How this would come about is never explained. Nor does he define the conditions of this "opening up" any more than he bothers to detail its parameters or how it would be controlled and organized. Needless to say, nobody from Robert McNamara down to Henry Kissinger has believed this advice, any more than does the present Administration (of which Huntington was a part).

One of the virtues of *The Common Defense* is its continuing relevance. Any book written about the past containing pointed relevance for the present is a rare item. Part IV of *The Common Defense* illustrates this well. In a way, it is the real heart of the
book, insofar as it details the actual procedures and pressures from inside official Washington operating toward the "common defense." As will be seen, these procedures and pressures are just as present in today's environment as they were in the 1950's. Huntington's representation of them, therefore, offers more than just chronology: it illustrates the operation of profound and lasting habits of the American political system.

The main issue in the final determination of the defense budget, according to Huntington, is political not economic, although the ultimate *modus operandi* always depends upon the external environment and the existence of a perceived threat. Huntington favors the priority of politics over economics. There was never an absolute "ceiling" on any of the defense budgets of the 1950's, he claims. Ceilings were always artificial, imposed by the conflicting demands of internal self-interest groups. Many economists of the time believed that the defense budgets could have been greatly increased-relative to the rest of the economy-without placing undue strains on the nation's wealth and resources. The reasons for "restraints" on defense spending, Huntington writes, were due to the necessity of each Administration to compromise the several competing political demands within the nation's vast constituency:

In determining the magnitude of the military effort, three constraints are often involved: absolute requirements of what is needed for security, absolute limits on "what the economy can afford," and absolute limits on what "the people will support." All three are artificial constructs invoked by participants in the policy-making process. No absolute requirements exist which, if met, will make the country secure and which, if unmet, will leave it insecure. (p. 250)

The idea of a rational, calculating strategic "actor" laying out coherent maps and plans for a global strategy, therefore, is a simplistic myth. If it was not present in the 1950's-when U.S. power was at its height-it would seem to be even less present today, at a time of relative decline in America's global influence. The competing demands and pressures inside contemporary Washington over such issues as SALT II, African policy, and the defense budget itself would seem to corroborate Huntington's thesis of self-induced compromise in the overall strategic decision-making process.

The main objective of the Eisenhower Administration, for example, was budgetary stability, a goal it pursued even more decidedly than military superiority. Eisenhower wanted to end the historic "feast or famine" spirals of past U.S. security efforts. Strong
domestic pressures to balance the budget and cut taxes overrode other efforts, from the military for example, to increase defense spending. "Alone," Huntington writes, "the military were no match for the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget" (p. 216).

This, again, has a familiar ring, as an increasing number of contemporary critics of defense spending complain of the great influence of OMB and the "restrictive" and artificial "ceilings" being "imposed" on today's defense budget. Reading The Common Defense, however, one gets an appreciation of the deep and lasting nature of such pressures inside the political system. Circumstances and issues may change, but underlying realities do not.

The disunity of the military itself is still another important and lasting phenomenon in the decision-making process which, equally, places self-induced limits on strategic programs. Huntington's research on this issue is also revealing and relevant:

No Administration was ever confronted with a united military establishment lacking a single coherent military plan. If an Administration had ever been so confronted, it would have been extremely difficult and perhaps impossible for the Administration not to have acquiesced in the military demands. (p. 218)

During the entire period under discussion a major rearmament program (aside from the Korean War) was undertaken only once, in 1948 as a response to Soviet actions in eastern Europe and Germany. Economy drives, however, were made in 1948 (later in that year, after rearmament measures had begun), 1953 and 1957; in all cases after the Administration had scored an electoral victory and wanted to assert control over the military. In each case, however, only conventional capabilities (bases, personnel) were cut; there was never a serious effort deliberately to erode strategic programs. The point, however, is clear: the reasons for cutbacks were political, and were only secondarily economic. In no instance were they strategic.

Huntington's findings on public attitudes toward defense spending are also revealing. Whether they remain true today is a debatable issue. During the 1946-60 period, however, the public at large was generally more pro-military than otherwise. With the exception of foreign aid, which it usually opposed (and still does), Huntington found that the public tended to fall behind the Administration when it took a definite stand. When the Administration wavered, public opinion, likewise, grew passive and permissive. On most
occasions, nonetheless, the general public, by voting analyses and opinion polls through the 1946-60 period, favored programs which meant greater preparedness and opposed those which didn't. These points, however, were qualified by an overall tendency to acquiesce in the Administration's guidance; a characteristic American trait to leave defense policy to the political leadership. The power of the executive over the public is emphasized by Huntington: "The public listens to the Administration, not the critics, and the reassurances of the Administration induce mass acquiescence in its policies." (p. 241). This is probably still true today. In post-Vietnam America, however, one would suspect a significantly less pro-military public than before (despite certain opinion polls which indicate a resurgence in pro-defense positions).

Huntington's analysis of party positions would probably still stand today, with certain exceptions. Overall, his research indicated that the Democrats favored a higher level of defense spending than Republicans. This he found to be due to factors of party responsibility (control of Congress and the Administration), sectionalism (southern Democratic conservative versus northern liberal Republican), and party ideology (pro-spending Democrats as opposed to budget-minded Republicans).

Part V compares innovations in four major strategic programs of the late 1940's and 1950's: deterrence, European defense, continental defense, and limited war. In reviewing the processes involved in each program Huntington has uncovered a set of truisms which, again, would probably hold today as well. He has found that the decisive factor in favor of any internally-developed strategic program was its support by the executive and by key congressional elements. In other words, there is no substitute for decisive leadership in "selling" a defense program. Those who resist, for whatever reasons, are forced into a "foot dragging" series of delays and ambushes. One cannot resist thinking about what Huntington wrote in 1961 and how it almost exactly parallels the 1977-78 attempts of Congressional defense "conservatives" to overturn or delay President Carter's cancellation of the B-1 bomber:

Favorable Administration decision on the critical issue . . . commits the government irrevocably to the new policy and purpose. Inevitably, however, the overall purpose can only be realized by many additional decisions which offer the opponents of the program further opportunity for obstruction and "foot dragging."

(p. 292)
Men and issues change; the system remains the same.

Another element of note in the process involved in strategic programs is the external factor: the level of perceived threat. It is common knowledge that, historically, the U.S. only responded forcefully to some dramatic foreign event, a Lusitania or a Pearl Harbor. The same was true, Huntington writes, during the Cold War. The Soviet atomic explosion in 1949, for example, triggered a series of important decisions on continental defense which, otherwise, would have been allowed to lapse indefinitely. The same is true with Sputnik in 1957: it set off a chain reaction which helped produce the Minuteman and Polaris programs of the 1960's.

The internal politics on defense programs, furthermore, are in some cases as important in shaping overall strategy and weapons as are foreign events. The process of arriving at some consensus on strategy is long and arduous; in some cases it may involve years of compromise and debate, both within the Administration and without. Even within the services; a natural rivalry can have profound implications for the final version of overall strategy. Here is how Huntington has summarized the influence of the Army in the strategic process of the 1950's:

Continued preoccupation with total war in an age of thermonuclear weapons and long-range jet bombers clearly meant the acceptance of a subordinate role for the Army in peacetime. Service interest compelled the Army to make a bid for long-range missile and space programs, on the one hand, and yet to break radically with its doctrinal heritage of total war, on the other. The New Look and the emergence of nuclear stalemate caused the Army to espouse the concept of limited war and to take the lead in developing programs which, in turn, eventually modified the massive retaliation strategy of the New Look. (p. 345)

Rivalries between other bureaucracies inside the executive branch can be equally important in shaping final decisions as those inside the same bureaucracy or between Congress and the President. The State Department, for example, tried to push limited war needs on the Army during 1948-49 but was rebuffed by the compelling need for strategic deterrence. Ten years later both positions reversed: the Army lobbied for limited war (against the Administration and the Air Force) but the State Department was, by then, unsympathetic.

Huntington's basic message, stripped of its sophistication and detail, is clear, permanent and compelling: rudimentary politics, starting at the lowest level and working toward the top, is the main
factor which determines the nature and composition of strategic programs inside the U.S. government. Rational and systematic calculation are, of course, always present in the background, but in the crudest sense possible, it is self-interest and old-fashioned horse trading that—ultimately—is responsible for U.S. national security programs. Depending on where one stands on this issue, the conclusion is either tragic and stupid or natural and logical. As Huntington has demonstrated the decisions of the 1940’s and 50’s, however, it is apparently the only method available to the complex and diffuse Washington bureaucracy. Who would dare to venture that it is any different today?

The politicization of the strategic decision-making process is illustrated well in the rivalry between the services, a point Huntington documents in Part VI of *The Common Defense*. Before World War II the military consisted of only two services—Army and Navy—and both tended to unite together against an apathetic or hostile civilian world. The vast influence of the Air Force in Cold War strategic planning, however, plus the greatly increased acceptance of the post-war military in public life fostered a proliferation of responsibilities and programs that intensified interservice rivalry. In many ways, interservice competition escalated in spite of the unification measures of 1947. A "divide and conquer" mentality was evident among non-military bureaucracies competing for strategic programs. Both the State Department and the Budget Bureau, for example, could pick and choose amongst the services to support their favored policy. So could the Congress. In 1950 the Army and the State Department gave their political support for conventional defense of Europe against a skeptical Air Force. Conversely, in 1954 when the State Department advanced massive retaliation it received overwhelming Air Force support against a dissenting Army. Of all the services, Huntington writes, the Navy was the most status quo oriented and generally satisfied, due mainly to its combination of air, sea, and land functional purposes. Since the Navy had several missions at once, it could appeal to a variety of constituents.

Since the services were greatly expanded after World War II their "constituencies" grew with them. Thus was born the natural alliance between the military and industry (the "military-industrial complex"). Rivalries increased in a mutually reinforcing competition for weapons and factories to produce them: "Interservice rivalry
stimulated industrial competition, and industrial competition, in turn, fanned the flames of interservice rivalry." (p. 399).

Not only did this rivalry influence American industry it also had a decisive impact upon strategic doctrine itself. The development of air power induced the Air Force to denigrate land and sea power in its quest for budgetary and promotional priority. The Army and Navy responded in kind, each promoting its own particular weapons and doctrines as "decisive" or "absolute" necessities for national security. If there are those who still believe that U.S. strategic programs are decided upon in an environment of rational and calculated decision-making, the following passage from The Common Defense should be instructive:

Despite the extent of strategic consensus, in the middle 1950's interservice debate was just as prevalent and intense as it had been previously. The issues at stake in the controversy, however, had changed in character. Strategic questions no longer dominated the discussion. Instead, proprietary issues had become prevalent. Neither the fundamental existence of the services nor fundamental alternatives of national strategy were at issue, but rather marginal gains and losses of resources, forces and weapons. The question of what should be done was less controversial than the questions of those who should do it and how much resources should be allocated to it. (p. 412)

In some important ways, therefore, interservice rivalry—and intragovernmental competition at large—shaped U.S. strategic programs of the 1950's. Not only did this rivalry produce a plethora of duplicative weapons (Thor, Jupiter, Titan, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman etc.) but it also at times determined basic strategic doctrine. Strategic deterrence benefited from the great priority it received from the Air Force, limited war grew in importance as the Army advanced it in the late 1950's, while continental defense suffered since it was the primary concern of no individual service.

In the final chapter of The Common Defense, Huntington offers a curious blend of optimism and pessimism for the future security policies of the United States. Admitting that the decision-making process, with all of its attendant interests and bureaucracies, was in a constant state of "disequilibrium," he nonetheless could still see a blurred ray of hope. All of the predicted strategic "catastrophes" of the period, he wrote, never came about. In most cases, the warnings that came from within the system, and which were aimed at the
Administration in power, sufficed to ward off the danger in time; "Prophecies of disaster when credited by the right people are non-fulfilling. The innovation of deterrent programs was adequate as long as it kept disaster three years in the future.". (p. 429).

Yet for how long could such chaos-or pure luck based upon technological supremacy-keep the wolf from the door? In 1961 Huntington was uncertain. He acknowledged what he conceived as the "interim" nature of deterrence but offered only a vague, non-descript policy of "participation" to replace it. He saw the powerful obstacles against disarmament and concluded, pessimistically, that deterrence would probably limp along until replaced by an as yet unforeseen alternative (he mentioned the possibility of "arms control," just emerging at that time).

As a long-distance participant in power politics, Huntington believed that the United States had basic problems: "The record of 1945 to 1960 . . suggests that its political system and ideology might well hamper the United States in playing a more positive and creative role in world politics" (p. 441). In the final analysis, Huntington remained skeptical about future "greatness" for U.S. foreign policy. He likened the American ship-of-state to a raft: ungainly and awkward but steady and safe. "It will not sink, but one's feet are always wet." (p. 447).

How Huntington's views have evolved since 1961 will be seen next in a brief summary of his major articles on the American military written since then.

III. Articles

The record of Huntington's several articles on the American military since 1961 falls into two categories: one set of articles which follow the themes of military professionalism argued in The Soldier and the State; the other set concerned with issues of strategy and program articulated in The Common Defense. Each will be taken in turn.

In Daedalus (Fall 1963) Huntington returned to explore "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession" within the confines of the debate he began in 1957 with The Soldier and the State. As is true of all of his important writings, whatever one thinks of him, Huntington is thoroughly consistent. The identical "pendulum" mentioned early in this review in connection with The Soldier and the State appears again in the Daedalus article with reference to devel-
opments since 1957. It is also the theme of the article insofar as it documents the decline of military influence in strategic planning under President Kennedy:

Immediately after World War II the balance of civil-military relations was disrupted by weakness on the civilian side, as a result the military leaders and institutions were drawn into political roles. This was unhealthy, and a restoration of the balance was clearly in order. If the pendulum is now swinging too far in the other direction, the cause lies in the slowness of the military response to the strategic and technological revolutions. (p. 804)

The reasons for this decline, according to Huntington, were five in number, most of which had to do with the gradual rise of civilian expertise in strategic planning, culminating in the civilian "whiz kids" of the McNamara Defense Department. True to the conservative philosophy of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington warned against an overeager diminution of professional military advice in program planning. The real fear, he wrote, lay not so much in an "unwarranted" military influence but in an escalating rise of frustrations among military professionals; frustrations which fed upon resentment and which, Huntington believed, would result in the traditional and historic withdrawal of the military from public life. To recoup the losses of the period, Huntington advised an intellectual "retooling" for professional officers to a level equal to the network of "think-tank" civilian specialists which grew up during the 1950's: "The future general with his Ph.D. will lack the political halo of a Marshall or a Eisenhower. Both characteristics, however, should help him in making a creative, professional contribution to national security." (p. 805).

This theme was taken up again in 1968, in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Vol. 2), when Huntington argued against those writers (e.g., Harold Lasswell & C. Wright Mills) who had become famous for their prophesies of doom against the so-called "military industrial complex." The influence of military officers in politics, Huntington believed, came more from the politicians themselves than from any inordinate ambitions of the military. This was true worldwide as much as it was in the U.S., and the corrective was not to condemn the military *per se* as it was to restore a healthy civil-military domestic balance. In countries such as Pakistan and Burma and in much of Latin America the military ruled because of the corruption and ineptitude of civilians. In the
United States, the problem was almost the opposite: how to integrate a professional and competent military into a liberal society generically suspicious of any perceived or real extension of military influence.

Huntington attempted to expose the "military-industrial complex" mythology again in 1969 in an article published by the Washington State Press. Here, he documented the nature of the American "defense industry" as being spread across a broad base of industrial activities: 26% of employment was in service industries, the bulk of the remainder was in manufacturing. Those industries commonly defined as the heart of the "M-I" complex actually accounted for less than a third of defense-generated employment. Nevertheless, Huntington still conceded the natural partnership between the defense industry and the military: "... the great bulk of the defense industry which works primarily for defense is primarily concerned with strategic weapons systems. As a result, this industry constitutes not just a natural lobby for a strong military policy but also a natural lobby for a military strategy in which strategic weapons play a major role." (p. 11). The success of the "anti-military opposition," however, was likely to have a reverse effect: it would rally the M-I complex into a more cohesive and disciplined group than it actually was. "When defense goes on the defensive," he wrote, "defense firms are more likely to see common interests in collaboration among themselves against an external threat." (p. 14).

Perhaps Huntington's most important article on military professionalism was published in 1977 by the American Enterprise Institute. Twenty years after The Soldier and the State, he traced the shifting patterns of civil-military relations and came up with several interesting conclusions and signposts for the future. His main point confirmed the view first advanced in Daedalus in 1963; namely, that the influence of the military in politics has been on a steady decline since the 1950's. This decline was greatly increased by a number of profound developments which began in the 1960's: the growth of domestic welfarism and "participatory democracy" in the United States, the Vietnam War and the change in international politics from a U.S.-centered bipolarity to multipolarity. Attendant to these circumstances was the dramatic rise of an anti-military intellectualism concurrent with the Vietnam War protests. All of these developments placed the previous patterns of civil-military relations into a phase of confusion and flux. The antimilitarism of the 1970's, in
many ways a throwback to historic American liberalism, was liable to put a number of serious constraints on the future use of U.S. military strength, Huntington believed, and would result in a further cutback in American global power. The best Huntington could offer for the near future was a limited ray of hope for the emergence of a healthy civil-military relationship he first argued for, and still believes in, in 1957:

As the effects of the democratic surge, the Vietnam War, and the enthusiasm for detente fade into the past, the prevailing attitude of American society toward its military forces is likely to be one of modified or contingent toleration. This attitude will be reinforced if the military limit the extent to which they turn inward and instead emphasize their professional military functions and characteristics without self-consciously breaking their ties with civilian society. (pp. 26-27)

About strategic programs and military policy (issues of The Common Defense) Huntington has written two articles since 1961. He is clearly more the sociologist and historian than the strategist. Nevertheless, both of these articles reveal him to be consistently balanced and conservative in approach and thoroughly intellectual in method.

The first article on military policy appeared in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968, Vol. 10). It repeated many of the insights and theoretical devices of his earlier works (the difference between military structure and strategy, strategic "pluralism" and "monism" etc.) with an interesting conclusion on military policy and the budgetary process. In the context of military decisions based upon an imposed budget, he maintained, there is no practical difference between strategic and structural issues. A decision divorced from budgetary considerations, however, is free from such constraints. Civilian control in this country, therefore, is often identified with budgetary control, a point which, ten years later, is equally true in the Washington bureaucracy (the contemporary influence of OMB over the defense budget is the prime example). With civilians controlling the budget, there is no wonder that strategic programs are usually the product of pork-barrel politics.

Huntington's other article on military policy appeared in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1973. It is much longer, more comprehensive, and more directly related to actual policy than the previous one. It is, in fact, the only purely policy-oriented, statement which Huntington has written for
publication. It states clearly his views on what ought and what ought not to be U.S. policy for the 1970's. Here he dropped his theoretical and historical intellectualism and moved into actual statecraft. Several points dominate. First, he noted that "... the pre-eminent feature of international politics at the present time is the relative decline in American power" (p. 5). To adjust to this fact Huntington advocated a series of military and political measures to shore up U.S. strength without either attempting a return to the world of the 1950's or of abdicating future global preeminence to the Soviet Union. The picture which emerges is that of a conservative-centrist, concerned with a stable international balance and devoid of any of the "crusading" manifestations of past U.S. diplomacy. He was advocating a mechanical equilibrium and deliberately shied away from a 1950's-style American dominated political globe.

Specifically, Huntington urged the U.S. to seek nuclear "parity" as opposed to "sufficiency" vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. He argued against a self-defeating isolationism from key areas of the world, although he had no qualms against a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe since he believed that the major threat there would remain political. In terms of conventional power, he advocated a policy of "counter-intervention" by U.S. forces in areas such as the Middle East and Latin America where the U.S. would have a natural advantage. This would have required a large navy with substantial air and marine units.

The world has changed considerably since Huntington wrote those lines six years ago. As a policy-maker in the Carter Administration, Huntington has been at least partially responsible for what has happened since 1977. The following conclusion will briefly profile his main characteristics as a scholar. His qualities as a policy-maker will be judged by history.

Conclusion

A main source for much of the controversy which has accompanied Huntington's work is the anti-militarism of the American people in main, and the philosophical liberalism which gave this phenomenon its roots and structure. When Huntington would write favorably, for example, on the professional military "ethic" he risked a hornet's nest of opposition from liberal academics. When Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, would expound on military strategy he would be received as a god-send. Why? The answer is almost too
obvious to relate: a civilian who does the military's job and outlines basic strategy (Kissinger) is justified; one who tries to bring the military into an integrated policy apparatus and who favors a strong and professional military voice (Huntington) is not. One is out-of-character with how the American ideology has viewed the military and its role; the other is not.

Huntington, therefore, has often been the suspect historian-sociologist turned "militarist." Since he has seldom concerned himself with strategy per se-unlike most of the other defense intellectuals-the liberal establishment had little reason to proclaim him as a "hero." From their perspective, he has appeared militaristic and European, almost Germanic in philosophy. Other academics, like Kissinger and Morgenthau whose birth and background were in fact European (German), have-ironically-seemed almost eastern liberal by comparison. This is an erroneous comparison, however, and bears only a superficial relationship to the facts, if even that.

Huntington is anything but a "militarist"-if that term means support and advocacy for a military domination of politics. He is opposed to the dominance of the military in political life, and has made no bones about it in all of his writings. What he does favor-and this is where he runs into trouble on the liberal side-is a realistic defense policy supported by a strong and confident professional military which is controlled, but not dominated by civilians. In contrast to the liberal establishment, Huntington is a "self-confessed" conservative and views the military ethic as an accurate reflection of the nature of international political life and as a compatible and healthy component of domestic politics.

Huntington is, above all, a pragmatic-rationalist conservative. There is nothing of the crusader in his writings. If anything, there is an overly detached outlook: the intellectual and scholar unearthing the pieces, putting them together and letting the facts speak for themselves. If those facts happen to indicate that the United States-by temperament and ideology-may not be capable of sustained great power leadership (as he indicated in The Common Defense), then we should learn to adjust to it. (This same point, incidentally, has been attributed to Dr. Kissinger by Admiral Zumwalt in On Watch.) If other facts indicate that we have viewed the military through a distorted and false perspective, then we should, likewise, adjust accordingly.

Huntington is much better at analysis than proscription. More
than anything else he is a scholar: brilliant, articulate, persuasive, and incisive, but too often uncertain or unclear on correctives. For the past two years he has been Dr. Brzezinski's deputy at the National Security Council. Without firsthand insight, one can only hope that he has translated a first-class analytical mind into a first-class policy-mind; one capable of making sound and difficult choices, of steering a persistent course through powerful obstacles and, above all, of achieving the leadership qualities—beyond scholasticism—which will continue to make this country great.

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